places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)' (Nye 2004a: 11) . Despite Nye's focus being primarily on the United States, and the vagueness associated with the concept of soft power, it has been enthusiastically adopted by countries around the world as an increasingly visible component of foreign policy strategy. It is a testimony to the formidable power of the US in the international arena that the phrase 'soft power' has acquired global currency and is routinely used in policy and academic literature as well as in elite journalism across the globe.
The capacity of nations to make themselves attractive in a globalizing marketplace for ideas has become an important aspect of contemporary international relations, as has been the goal of communicating a favourable image of a country or countering negative portrayals in an era of digital global flows, involving both state and non-state actors and networks. In the past decade, many countries have set up 'public diplomacy' departments within their ministries of foreign affairs, while a number of governments have sought the services of public relations and lobbying firms to coordinate their 'nation-branding initiatives,' aimed at attracting foreign investment and tourism (Aronczyk, 2013) .
As one of the world's fastest growing economies and with a pluralist and secular polity, India is increasingly being viewed as a global economic and political power. On the basis of purchasing-power parity, in 2015 India was the world's third largest economy, behind the United States and China, despite being home to 40 per cent of the world's poorest people (Drèze and Sen, 2013; IMF, 2014) . Parallel to its rising economic power, is the growing global awareness and appreciation of India's soft power-its mass media, celebratory religiosity (Yoga and Ayurveda) and popular culture (Tharoor, 2012; Hall, 2012; Thussu, 2013) . It is important to note that India's soft power has a civilizational dimension to it, the Indic civilization, dating back more than 5,000 years, being one of the major cultural formations in the world, from religion and philosophy, arts and architecture, to language and literature, trade and travel. India is the origin of four of the world's religions-Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism-and as a place where every major faith, with the exception of Shintoism and Confucianism, has coexisted for millennia, India offers a unique and syncretized religious discourse (Sen, 2005; Tharoor, 2012; Thussu, 2013 ).
India's global influence has a long and complex history. Its soft power in historical terms was directed not toward the West but to Asia. India's cultural influence across East and Southeast Asia during the early centuries of the Christian era, was through the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism. The millennia-old relationship between India and the rest of Asia has a strong cultural and communication dimension. Buddhism was at the heart of this interaction, with the widest dissemination of ideas emanating from what constitutes India today, and remains a powerful link between the Indic and the Chinese civilizations (Liu, 1988; Sen, 2005) . Narratives on Buddha's life and teachings are still a cultural referent in much of Asia, while traces of Indic languages, cuisine, dance, and other art forms survive in parts of southeast Asia, notably in Indonesia. Buddhism is the state religion in Thailand (where it arrived from India in second century AD) and a major influence in countries like Sri Lanka, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Japan and China (home to the largest number of Buddhists in the world) (Liu, 1988) .
Two of the world's other great religions -Christianity and Islam -also have very long associations with India. Some of the earliest Christian communities were established in South India: St. Thomas is supposed to be buried in Chennai in southern India and one of the world's oldest mosques is also located in India. Had British imperialism not partitioned India at independence in 1947, India would have become the world's largest Muslim country in terms of population. Today India is home to the second largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia, accounting for 11 per cent of the global total. This minority has contributed significantly to the millennia-old Indo-Islamic culture, notable for its classical music, poetry, and cuisine, and playing a key role in the development of Indian cinema. Such demographics also provide India with valuable cultural capital to promote its soft power among Islamic populations.
Adding to this legacy is India's long and continuing encounter with European modernity and its contribution to strategic autonomy epitomised by leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of non-violence and tolerance -whose thoughts influenced such leaders as Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela -and Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India's first Prime Minister and an eloquent champion of non-alignment in international relations (Bayly, 2011) . This rare combination of a civilization which has strong Hindu-Buddhist foundations, interactions with Chinese civilization and centuries of Islamic influence, and integration with Western institutions and ideas, gives India cultural resources to deal with the diverse, globalized and complex realities of the twenty-first century.
From mobile telephony to online communication, India has witnessed a revolution in the production and distribution of its cultural products. Unlike in the West, the media are booming in India: newspaper circulation is rising (India is the world's largest newspaper market); the country has more dedicated television news channels-400 in 2015-than the whole of Europe put together and it is also home to the world's largest film industry.
There is a steady growth in the visibility of cultural products from India-from Bollywood cinema to Bhangra music (Gera- Roy, 2010; Kohli-Khandekar, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015 , Gehlawat, 2015 . The digital revolution has ensured that these are now reaching all corners of the globe, largely through the increasingly vocal and visible 25-million strong Indian diaspora -the second largest after the Chinese and also the world's biggest English-speaking diaspora -and this has contributed to India's soft power (Thussu, 2013) .
This change in India's global status has coincided with the relative economic decline of the West, creating the opportunity for an emerging power such as India to participate in global governance structures hitherto dominated by the US-led Western alliance (Zakaria, 2008; Acharya, 2014) . Given its history as the only major democracy which did not blindly follow the West during the Cold War years, pursuing a nonaligned foreign policy, India has the potential to take up a more significant leadership role. Despite its growing economic and strategic relations with Washington, it maintains close ties with 6 other major and emerging powers. India's presence at the Group of 77 developing nations and at the G-20 leading economies of the world has been effective in articulating a Southern perspective on global affairs.
India is also a key member of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), whose annual summits since 2009 are being increasingly noticed outside the five countries, which together account for 20 percent of the world's GDP (Nordenstreng and Thussu, 2015) . The United Nations Development Programme's 2013 Human Development Report predicts that by 2020 the combined economic output of China, India and Brazil will surpass the aggregate production of the US, Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Italy. As the report, titled The Rise of the South, notes: 'economic exchanges are expanding faster 'horizontally'-on a South-South basis-than on the traditional North-South axis. People are sharing ideas and experiences through new communications channels and seeking greater accountability from governments and international institutions alike. The South as a whole is driving global economic growth and societal change for the first time in centuries' (UNDP, 2013: 123) .
Within this geo-political environment, there is growing recognition of the importance of soft power in a digitally connected and globalized communication environment, and in this the media play a key role. Despite the unprecedented growth of media and cultural industries in the BRICS nations, particularly in such countries as China, India and Brazil, the global media continue to be dominated by the US. Given its formidable political, economic, technological and military power, American or Americanized media are available across the globe, in English or in dubbed or indigenized versions fuelling the $1.3 trillion global media and cultural industry, one of the fastest growing in the world, accounting for more than 7 per cent of global GDP. As in the twentieth century, the US remains today the largest exporter both of the world's entertainment and information programmes and the software and hardware through which these are distributed across the increasingly digitized globe (Thussu, forthcoming) .
The sources of such 'soft' media power in the United States cannot be separated from its hard power, as the world's most powerful country in economic, political and military terms, expressed in its more than 1,000 military bases across the globe and an enormous defence budget (more than $600 billion in 2013, according to the Londonbased International Institute for Strategic Studies), unmatched by any other nation. It is American hard power that impacts on many countries and helps legitimize the American way of life, promoted through its formidable soft power reserves -from Hollywood entertainment giants to the digital empires of the internet age. As Nye has remarked, US culture 'from Hollywood to Harvard -has greater global reach than any other' (Nye, 2004b: 7) .
One reason for the US domination of global media is that the country has always followed a commercial model for its media industry -a venture in which the successive US governments have been a crucial factor. Broadcasting in the United States -both radio and television -had a commercial remit from its very inception. Three main national networks -CBS, NBC and ABC-provided both mass entertainment and public 8 information. The entertainment element was strong in all three, with game-and-talent shows as well as glamour and celebrity programming becoming the staple diet (McChesney, 1999) . In the post-Cold War world, the US-inspired commercial model of media has been globalized, a phenomenon that Hallin and Mancini have characterised as the 'triumph of the liberal model' (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 251) .
The global growth of Indian media
The rapid liberalization, deregulation and privatization of media and cultural industries have transformed broadcasting in India over the last two decades (Athique, 2012; KohliKhandekar, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015) . The unprecedented expansion of televisionfrom a single state channel in 1991 to over 800 channels in 2015, was paralleled by the growth of a new middle-class audience. At the same time the expansion of global digital media industries and distribution technologies ensured that Indian entertainment channels and films are increasingly visible in the global media sphere (Kaur and Sinha, 2005; Iordanova et al, 2006; Kavoori and Punathambekar, 2008; Gera Roy, 2010; Gera Roy, 2012; Dudrah, 2012; Schaefer and Karan, 2013; Punathambekar, 2013; Gehlawat, 2015) .
With more than 400 round-the-clock news channels and a strong tradition of Englishlanguage journalism, Indian perspectives on global affairs are accessible via such channels as News 18 India, TV Today and NDTV 24x7. All three are private networks, while the Indian state broadcaster Doordarshan remains one of the few major state news networks not available in important global markets at a time when global television news in English has expanded to include inputs from countries where English is not widely used, including Qatar (Al-Jazeera English), China (CCTV News), Russia (RT), Japan (NHK World) and Iran (Press TV). The absence of Doordarshan in the global media sphere can be ascribed to bureaucratic apathy and inefficiency, though, in an age of what Philip Seib has called 'real-time diplomacy,' the need to take communication seriously has never been greater (Seib, 2012) . Paradoxically, Indian journalism and news media in general are losing interest in the wider world at a time when Indian industry is increasingly globalizing and international engagement with India is growing from across the globe. For private news networks, the need for global expansion is limited, since, in market terms, news has a relatively small audience and therefore meagre advertising revenue.
Belatedly, the Indian government has woken up to promoting its external broadcasting.
A high-level committee recommended that Prasar Bharati, India's public service broadcaster, should have a 'global outreach' (Prasar Bharati, 2014) . Its vision is to:
'create a world-class broadcasting service benchmarked with the best in the world using next-generation opportunities, technologies, business models and strategies. The platform should be designed for new media first and then extended to conventional TV; [and to] outline an effective content strategy for Prasar Bharati's global platforms (TV and Radio) focused on projecting the national view rather than the narrow official viewpoint' (Prasar Bharati, 2014: 15) .
While Indian television news may not yet have made any impact globally, the Hindi film industry, popularly known as Bollywood has emerged as one of the most notable examples of global entertainment emanating from outside the Western world (KohliKhandekar, 2013; Punathambekar, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015) . It remains the prominent manifestation of Indian content in the global media sphere, and is today a $3.5 billion industry, which has helped to make the country an attractive investment destination.
Watched by audiences in more than 70 countries, Bollywood is the world's largest film factory in terms of production and viewership: every year a billion more people buy tickets for Indian movies than for Hollywood films. Though India has exported films to countries around the world since the 1930s, it is only since the 1990s and in the new millennium that Bollywood has become part of the 'global popular'. The explosion in the number of television channels was a massive boost for the movie industry, not only with the emergence of many dedicated film-based pay-channels but also for its coverage of the film industry itself, given the huge demand of the new channels for content (KohliKhandekar, 2013 ).
According to industry estimates, the Indian entertainment and media industry was worth $29 billion in 2013 (FICCI-KPMG, 2015) . In addition to exporting its own media products, India is increasingly a production base for Hollywood and other US media corporations, especially in areas such as animation and post-production services.
These growing cultural links with the US-dominated transnational media corporations also facilitate the marketing and distribution of Indian content. As international investment increases in the media sector, with the relaxation of cross-media ownership Thussu, 2013: 128) .
Bollywood as Indian soft power?
The term Bollywood, coined in a journalistic column in India -and contested and commended in almost equal measure -refers to a major cultural industry which dominates all media in India, including television, radio, print, on-line content and advertising. Films also contribute to the massively popular music industry. For some, the negative connotation of the word Bollywood is that it is a derivative, imitative and low-quality version of the world's richest film factory -Hollywood -but in terms of the production of feature films and viewership, India leads the world: every year on average 1,000 films are produced (apart from the Hindi-language cinema other major film industries within India include the Tamil, Telugu and Bengali -also catering to large diasporic constituencies). Bollywood, as the biggest and the richest, is seen both by government and industry as a soft power asset for India -one of the few non-Western countries to make its presence felt in the mainstream global cinema market.
Cinema in India has a strong pedigree: within months of the invention of the motion picture by the Lumière brothers in France in 1895, films were being shown in Bombay, and film production in India started two years later. In 1913, the first full length Hindi feature film Raja Harishchandra, based on the life of a mythological king of ancient India, was released. In the silent era (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) more than 1,200 films were made in India and in 1931, India entered the sound era, and within a year, 28 full-length feature films in three languages were released (Barnouw and Krishnaswamy, 1980) . Even before India became an independent nation, films from India were being exported to south-east Asian and African nations. One reason for the popularity of Indian films among other developing countries was their larger-than-life characters, escapist melodramatic narrative style, and song and dance sequences (Rajadhyaksha, 2009 ).
The anti-colonial and progressive ideology which defined the formative years of Indian cinema was also attractive for governments in the communist world. The 1946 film Dharti Ke Lal (Children of the Earth) produced by the Indian People's Theatre 13 Association, was the first film to receive widespread distribution in the Soviet Union. It has been suggested that one candidate for the title of the 'most popular film of all times' is Awaara (Vagabond, released in 1951) , directed by Raj Kapoor, one of India's most popular actors, as it was very successful in the Soviet Union and China, as well as in many other countries (Iordanova, et al. 2006) . In Russia, Indian films continue to attract interest: the state-owned channel Domashny (Home) broadcasts Bollywood, while India TV, a corporation owned by the Moscow-based Red Media Group, has been showing Indian films and other programming in that country since 2006 (Rajagopalan, 2008) .
The deregulated and privatized global broadcasting environment and the availability of digital television and online delivery systems have ensured that Bollywood content is available to new and varied international audiences. Expansion, particularly into the lucrative US and European markets during the 1990s, was made possible by the availability of satellite platforms: Indian channels including Zee, Star and B4U (Bollywood for You) became available in Europe on Sky's digital network, and in the US, on Echostar DISH system and DirecTV. With the growing convergence between television and the internet, these channels now have a global viewership (Rai, 2009; Dudrah, 2012; FICCI-KPMG, 2015) .
In 2000, the Indian film industry was formally given the status of an industry by the Indian government, authorizing the Industrial Development Bank of India to provide loans to filmmakers, thus ensuring it could become a major source of revenue as well as an instrument for promoting India's soft power. Such a move was also aimed at encouraging foreign investors to engage with the Indian entertainment industry. One outcome of such official support was that investments began to flow from telecom, software and media sectors into an industry hitherto operating within an opaque financial system. The ensuing corporatization and the synergies this created made it possible for Bollywood content to be available on multiple platforms, satellite, cable, online and mobile, resulting in a complex, globalized production, distribution and consumption practices including among the 35-million strong South Asian diaspora, scattered on all continents (FICCI-KPMG, 2015) .
From a soft power perspective, Bollywood is perhaps more effective among other countries of the global South (Tharoor, 2012) . The Bollywood brand, co-opted by India's corporate and governmental elite and celebrated by members of its diaspora, has come to define a creative and confident India. Gone are the days when diasporic communities felt embarrassed about the cinema of their country of origin, perceived by many in host nations as glitzy and kitschy. Today, Hindi films are released simultaneously across the globe, its stars are recognized faces in international advertising and entertainment (Punathambekar, 2013) . There are many festivals and functions centred on Bollywood, and prestigious universities offer courses and research into this form of popular culture (Gehlawat, 2015) . In 2008, Prime Minister Singh told Indian Foreign Service probationers, that the 'soft power of India in some ways can be a very important instrument of foreign policy. Cultural relations, India's film industry -Bollywood -I find wherever I go in Middle-East, in Africa -people talk about Indian films. So that is a new way of influencing the world about the growing importance of India. Soft power is equally important in the new world of diplomacy' (quoted in Thussu, 2013: 134) .
The primary market, though, remains the diasporic one, the UK/US segment of which has been revitalized in the past two decades. Given the importance of London as a global media centre, Bollywood has invested heavily to make its presence felt there:
Britain accounts for a fifth of the global revenue for Bollywood's international releases.
Eros International, the world's leading producer and distributor of Bollywood films, is headquartered in the British capital (Rai, 2009; Dudrah, 2012; Punathambekar, 2013) . Northern Nigeria too has a long-established interest in Hindi cinema. The mushrooming of Hindi-to-Hausa video studios, where Indian films are routinely adapted or copied for the Nollywood market, indicates their value as cultural artefacts which can be reworked to suit local tastes and sensibilities (Larkin, 2003) . The 'visual affinities' of dress, gender segregation, and the limited sexual content in Hindi films, are attributes which Nigerian audiences appreciate. In Indonesia, where Indian cultural and religious influence has a long history, Bollywood films and music are popular, influencing local music. Since the late 1990s, the Indonesian popular music form dangdut has borrowed and copied songs from Bollywood films, setting Bollywood tunes to words in Indonesia's official language Bhasha. Even in East Asia, in countries with their own large, sophisticated and commercialised film and entertainment industries, Indian popular culture has made inroads: in South Korea an internet-based service, TVing, broadcasts such Indian entertainment channels as Zee TV Asia, Zee Cinema, and the Bollywood music channel Zing.
Although Indian films were popular in communist China as a useful alternative to state propaganda and a cheap substitute for a Hollywood extravaganza, they had almost 
Synergies with Hollywood's soft power
The growing visibility of Bollywood outside India has also been bolstered by the emerging synergies with Hollywood. Apart from the US, India is the only other major film market in the world where the majority of the box office is dominated by domestic filmsmore than 80 per cent in the case of India. Given the size of India's market and its growing economic prowess, Hollywood producers are keen to forge business ties with India. The changed geo-political situation, with India becoming a close ally of the USpursuing a neoliberal free-market economic agenda -has contributed to facilitating this relationship (Ernst & Young, 2012; Punathambekar, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015 The Indian government could learn from the State Department about how it promotes the American cultural industries internationally. As a major information technology power, Indian government and corporations could deploy new digital delivery mechanisms to further strengthen the circulation of Indian entertainment and infotainment in a globalized media world. In the digitised globe, film entertainment in India is no longer just an artistic or creative enterprise but a global brand, contributing to the reimagining of India's role on the international stage from that of a socialist-oriented voice of the Third World to a rapidly modernizing, market-driven democracy with global economic and cultural connections.
The power of the diaspora
One key reason for the popularity of Indian cinema is the existence of India's extensive and successful diaspora scattered around the world, their presence going back in some cases to 150 years (Amrith, 2011) . This diaspora is also a critical resource for soft power dissemination, especially in the United States and Britain, where many Indians hold influential positions in boardrooms of transnational corporations, Ivy League universities and premium media organizations (Kapur, 2010) These are, in the words of Nye, 'soft power resources' (Nye, 2004a: 6 ). India's official public diplomacy infrastructure, though still in its early stages, has begun to engage foreign publics and, in collaboration with increasingly globalizing Indian industries, have been working to project India as an investment-friendly, pro-market democracy (Rana, 2009; Hall, 2012) . Communicating such an image has involved a public-private partnership to brand India using the power of Bollywood: to mark the 60 years of India's independence, the Public Diplomacy Division of India's External Affairs Ministry issued three videos on Bollywood, including Made in Bollywood; Bollywood: 60 Years of Romance and Hindi in Bollywood.
As India's international profile has grown many members of its diaspora are attempting to reconnect with the emerging economic powerhouse (Tharoor, 2012) . Among the policy elite in India, the diaspora is increasingly viewed as an important dimension of the However, mere possession of such resources does not make a country attractive on the world stage; these assets need to be translated into influencing the behaviour of other states and stakeholders, requiring a concerted effort by policy makers. Unlike China, India's soft power initiatives are not centrally managed by the government. Indeed, the government takes a backseat while India's creative and cultural industry, its religions and spirituality, as well as its active diaspora and businesses help promote Indian interests abroad, a phenomenon likely to accelerate in an increasingly globalized and networked world. As Tharoor notes, 'India benefits from its traditional practices (from Ayurveda to Yoga, both accelerating in popularity across the globe) and the transformed image of the country created by its thriving diaspora. Information technology has made its own contribution to India's soft power' (Tharoor, 2012: 284) To make India a more attractive country, especially among other developing nations, would require it to address the serious deprivation that millions of its citizens suffer on a daily basis. Despite its admirable economic performance in the past two decades, India is still home to more poor people than the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a country where multiple and multi-layered forms of inequalities persist: India has the largest pool of employable youth in the world but it also has the planet's highest incidence of child labour, despite it being banned in law. While dozens of Indians figure (Bardhan, 2010; Drèze and Sen, 2013) . As Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen note: 'even though India has significantly caught up with China in terms of GDP growth, its progress has been very much slower than China's in indicators such as longevity, literacy, child undernourishment and maternal mortality' (Drèze and Sen, 2013: 8) . India continues to be perceived, accurately, as a country of extreme poverty, structural social inequalities, and cultural backwardness. As Tharoor notes: the benefits of economic growth ' have not yet reached the third of our population still living below the poverty line. We must ensure they do, or our soft power will ring hollow, at home and abroad' (Tharoor, 2012: 288) .
As the world becomes increasingly mobile, networked and digitized, will Indian cultural flows help provide an alternative discourse to counter US media hegemony or supplement it? In his 2011 book The Future of Power, Nye explored the nature and shift in global power structures -from state to non-state actors. In an age when 'public diplomacy is done more by publics', governments have to use 'smart power' ('neither hard nor soft. It is both'), making use of formal and informal networks and drawing on 'cyber power', an arena where the US has a huge advantage, being the country which invented the internet and remains at the forefront of governing it technologically, and dominating it both politically as well as economically. The Indian presence is also growing in cyberspace. In the last 15 years, India has seen an exceptional expansion in the internet, with an increase of 6,980 per cent. In 2000, only 5.5 million Indians (with a penetration rate of 0.5 per cent of the population) were on-line; by 2015 that figure had grown exponentially and there were 354 million internet users (and the penetration rate had crossed 28 per cent of the population), making them the world's second largest internet users after China. In that year, India surpassed the United States to become the world's biggest 'open' internet. Industry estimates suggest that by 2018 the number of internet users in India is expected to exceed 600 million, increasingly driven by wireless connections (Jeffrey and Doron, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015) .
It is interesting to speculate what kind of content will be circulating on the World Wide Web, and in which language, when a much higher percentage of Indians get online. As their prosperity grows, a sizeable segment of young Indians will be going online, 27 increasingly producing, distributing and consuming digital media, especially using their skills in the English language, the vehicle for global communication. The Indian government's $18 billion 'Digital India' initiative, launched in 2015 -with its slogan 'power to empower', to bring internet access to people across the country, had enthusiastic support from both Indian and global conglomerates: $71 billion was earmarked by Indian conglomerates to provide the last-mile connectivity for electronic commerce and communication. This unfolding digital revolution, particularly significant in a country with strong 'demographic dividend' -India boasts the largest population of youth in the world -will ensure that Indic ideas, including Bollywoodized entertainment, will travel across global electronic superhighways in much vaster volume, and eventually, of greater value, strengthening the already well-established connection between India and its diaspora.
However, beyond Bollywood what would make Indian soft power more effective globally would be for India to devise a developmental path which reduces, if not eliminates, its persistently pervasive poverty and inequality. While growing economic prowess has made some Indians rich and created a globalized Indian middle class, it has also contributed to increased inequality among the poorest, victims of economic and ecological excesses of neo-liberalism -both national and transnational (Kohli, 2012; Drèze and Sen, 2013) . One area where an Indian contribution will be particularly valuable is development communication. India was the first country to use television for education through its 1970s SITE (Satellite Instructional Television Experiment) programme (Agrawal, 1977) . It is well-equipped to deploy new digital media technologies to promote sustainable development. An Indian model of development within a democratic and pluralistic system -and in contrast to the Chinese one -would be worth emulating for many nations struggling with developmental models designed by the West. The Indian soft power resources in multilateral bureaucracies, the international nongovernmental sector, and communication and media fields can be harnessed to redefine a development discourse-one which is shaped in New Delhi rather than in New York.
